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THEISM, PLATONISM, AND THE METAPHYSICS 
OF MATHEMATICS 
Christopher Menzel 
In a previous paper, Thomas V. Morris and I sketched a view on which abstract objects, 
in particular, properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs), are created by God no less 
than contingent, concrete objects. In this paper r suggest a way of extending this account 
to cover mathematical objects as well. Drawing on some recent work in logic and 
metaphysics, I also develop a more detailed account of the structure of PRPs in answer 
to the paradoxes that arise on a naive understanding of the structure ofthe abstract universe. 
§ 1 The Dilemma of the Theistic Platonist 
Theists generally hold that God is the creator of all there is distinct from himself. 
Traditionally, the scope of God's creative activity has extended across two 
disjoint realms: The physical, whose chief exemplars are ordinary middle-size 
objects, and the mental or spiritual, encompassing such things as angels and 
souls. Now, many theists are also platonists, or "metaphysical realists." That 
is, in addition to the physical and mental realms, some theists also acknowledge 
the existence of a realm of abstract objects like numbers, sets, properties, and 
propositions. For such theists, the traditional understanding of creation presents 
a philosophical and theological dilemma. On the platonist conception, most, if 
not all, abstract objects are thought to exist necessarily. One can either locate 
these entities outside the scope of God's creative activity or not. If the former, 
then it seems the believer must compromise his view of God: rather than the 
sovereign creator and lord of all things visible and invisible, God turns out to 
be just one more entity among many in a vast constellation of necessary beings 
existing independently of his creative power. If the latter, the believer is faced 
with the problem of what it could possibly mean for God to create an object 
that is both necessary and abstract. 
Though not utterly incompatible with a robust theism, the first hom of the 
dilemma seems undesirable for the theistic platonist. God remains the greatest 
possible being, since, presumably, it is not possible for any being to exert any 
influence over abstract entities; but the platonist must put severe, indeed embar-
rassing, qualifications on the scope of God's creative activity and on his status 
as the source of all existence. This leaves the platonist with the second hom, 
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viz., making sense of the idea of creation with respect to necessary, abstract 
objects. In a separate paper, Tom Morris and I have argued that sense can indeed 
be made of this idea. 1 
An early obstacle to avoid is the (roughly) deistic model of the creation. On 
this model, God's creation of an object is conceived of as a distinct, isolable, 
temporally located event of (at most) finite duration, and after its occurrence the 
object continues to exist of its own ontological momentum. This model is no 
doubt incompatible with the thesis at hand, since there could be no time at which 
God could have brought a necessary, hence eternal, being into existence. But 
there is just no a priori reason whatever to rule out the possibility of eternal 
creatures. Hence, a more subtle model is needed. 
A model that is both philosophically and theologically sounder on this point 
is that of continuous creation. In its most fundamental sense, to create something 
is to cause it to be, to playa direct causal role in its existing. 2 It is this broader 
conception of creation that is incorporated in the model in question. On that 
model, God is always playing a direct causal role in the existence of his creatures; 
his creative activity is essential to a creature's existence at all times throughout 
its temporal career, irrespective of whether or not there happens to be a specific 
time at which he begins to cause it to exist. 3 This then provides us with a 
framework in which it can be coherently claimed that God creates absolutely all 
objects, necessary or not: one simply holds that, necessarily, for any object a 
(other than God himself) and time t, God plays a direct causal role in a's existing 
at t.' 
With that obstacle removed, the next step is to give some account of the sort 
of causal relation there could be between God and the abstract objects we want 
to claim he creates. Here Morris and I essentially just reclothe the venerable 
doctrine of divine ideas in contemporary garb. We call the refurbished doctrine 
"theistic activism." Very briefly, the idea is this. We take properties, relations, 
and propositions (PRPs, for short) to be the contents of a certain kind of divine 
intellective activity in which God, by his nature, is essentially engaged. To grasp 
a PRP, then, whether by abstracting from perceptual experience, or perhaps by 
"combining" PRPs already grasped, is to grasp a product of the divine intellect, 
a divine idea. This divine activity is thus causally efficacious: PRPs, as abstract 
products of God's "mental life," exist at any given moment because God is 
thinking them;5 which is just to say that he creates them. 
§2 Activism, Numbers, and Sets 
With regard to PRPs then, the activist model provides a coherent, substantive 
(if programmatic) account of the sort of activity in which God is engaged that 
gives rise to abstract objects. On the face of it, though, a substantial, indeed 
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perhaps the most important, portion of the abstract universe is not obviously 
accounted for, viz., the abstract ontology of mathematics. In particular, how do 
numbers and sets fit into the picture? Traditionally, these entities are not thought 
of as PRPs of any kind, and hence they find no clear place in the story thus far. 
I want to argue that a place can be found, though the search is going to lead 
us into some fairly deep waters. Let's begin with numbers. A natural view of 
the numbers, as I will argue below, is that they are properties. For the past 
century, however, the dominant view of the numbers has been that they are 
abstract particulars of one kind or another. The philosophical roots of this view 
go back to Frege, in particular, to one of his most distinctive doctrines: that 
there is an inviolable ontological divide between the denotations (Bedeutungen) 
of predicates, or concepts (Begrijfe), and the denotations of singular temls, or 
objects (Gegenstiinde). Taking 'property' to be a loose synonym for 'concept', 
this doctrine entails that no property can be denoted by a singular term. Since 
in mathematics the numbers are in fact denoted by singular terms, e.g., most 
saliently, the numerals, it follows that the numbers are not properties but objects, 
or, loosely once again, particulars. 
Now, while few would dispute the inviolability of the distinction between 
properties and particulars, there are well known and notorious difficulties with 
the idea that this is simultaneously a distinction between the semantic values of 
predicates and the semantic values of singular terms. 6 We needn't rehearse these 
in detail here. For present purposes, let's just note first that our ordinary usage 
itself doesn't easily square with Frege's doctrine. For there exist a prodigious 
number of singular terms in natural language that, to all appearances, refer 
straightforwardly to properties: abstract singUlar terms (,wisdom', 'redness'), 
infinitives (,to dance', 'to raise chickens'), gerunds ('being faster than Willie 
Gault', 'running for president'), etc. Now, there are several non-Fregean semantic 
theories in which this fact of natural language is preserved, i.e., theories that 
are type-free in the sense that difference in ontological type (property, particular, 
etc.) is not reflected in a difference of semantic type (referent of predicate, 
referent of singular term, etc.) that prevents singular terms from referring to 
properties. 7 Hence, we can consistently maintain, pace Frege, that at least some 
properties are the semantic values of both predicates and singular terms. There 
are thus good reasons for rejecting Frege's semantic doctrine, and hence no 
cogent reasons for rejecting the idea that numbers are properties, a priori on 
Fregean grounds. 
There are two plausible accounts that identify the numbers with properties, 
both of which trace their origins back to the beginnings of contemporary 
mathematical logic. The first extends back to Frege himself. Frege clearly saw 
that statements of number typically involve the predication of a numerical property 
of some kind. For Frege, what is involved is the predication of such a property 
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to a concept. Thus, for example, the statement "There are four moons of Jupiter" 
is the predication of the property having four instances (which is expressed by 
the quantifier 'There are four') of the concept moons of Jupiter. Frege's concepti 
object doctrine however prevented him from taking this property itself to be the 
number four, assigning that function rather to its extension. s As we've just seen, 
though, one needn't follow Frege here. In the absence of this doctrine, one is 
free to make the identification in question, and hence, in general, to take the 
number n to be the property of having n instances. 9 
Cantor suggested a different though related view in his (often entirely opaque) 
discussions of the nature of number. Cantor's insight was that the notion of 
number is understood most clearly in terms of a special relation between sets: 
we associate the same number with two sets just in case they are "equivalent," 
i.e., just in case a one-to-one correspondence can be established between the 
members of the sets. In assigning the same number to two sets then, we are 
isolating a common property the two sets share; such properties (roughly) Cantor 
identifies as the cardinal numbers. In his words, the cardinal number of a given 
set Mis 
the general concept under which fall all and only those sets which are 
equivalent to the given set. 10 
More precisely, the number n is a property common to all and only n membered 
sets, or more simply, the property of having n members." Russell presents 
essentially the same account in The Principles of Mathematics, though he ulti-
mately rejects it (unnecessarily, as it happens) because of problems he finds with 
its nonextensional character. 12 
There are thus at least two ways of understanding the numbers to be properties, 
both of which are natural and appealing. The first, quasi-Fregean account has a 
semantical bent, focussing in particular on the predicative nature of statements 
of number, while the Cantorian account emphasizes the intuitive connection 
between number and relative size in the more general, abstract form of one-to-one 
correspondence between sets. Both, however, provide us with good reasons for 
thinking that numbers are properties of some kind. If so, we have found room 
for numbers within our theistic framework. 
Now, of course, if we adopt the Cantorian view of number, then it obviously 
remains to explain just how sets fit into our picture. We could avoid this question 
by choosing instead the quasi-Fregean picture, since it makes no appeal to sets. 
We will not so choose, however, for two reasons. First, for reasons I will not 
go into here, I think the Cantorian view is the superior of the two accounts. 
Second, perhaps more importantly, we want to be able to give our picture the 
broadest possible scope, and hence we want it to encompass all manner of 
abstract flora and fauna whose existence platonism might endorse. 
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So what then are we to say about sets? Are they too assimilable into our 
framework as it stands? Formally, yes. Both George Bealer and Michael Jubien, 
for instance, have developed theories in which sets are identified with certain 
"set-like" properties; roughly, a set {a,b, ... } is taken to be the property being 
identical with a or being identical with b or .... '3 Given sufficiently powerful 
property theoretic axioms, one can then show that analogues of the usual axioms 
of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory hold for these set-like properties, and hence that 
one loses none of the mathematical power of standard set theory. 
But this is not an altogether happy move. For instance, as Cocchiarella has 
noted, intuitively, sets are just not the same sort of thing as properties. Sets are 
generally thought of as being wholly constituted by their members; a set, "has 
its being in the objects which belong to it. "14 This conception is deeply at odds 
with the view of PRPs that underlies metaphysical realism, according to which 
PRPs "are in no sense to be thought of as having their being in the objects which 
are their instances. "[5 Since however it is this very idea of sets as having their 
being in their members that motivates the axioms of ZF, and since this is an 
inappropriate conception of properties, there seems to be no adequate motivation 
for a ZF style property theory. 
So there is at least ground for suspicion of the thesis that sets are just a species 
of property. It would be desirable, then, if our account could respect the intuitive 
distinction between the two sorts of entity. In particular, we should like to trace 
the origin of sets to a different, and more appropriate, sort of divine activity 
than that to which we've traced the origin of PRPs. But what sort? Here we 
have a fairly rich (though often unduly obscure) line of thought to draw upon 
from the philosophy of set theory. A common idea one often encounters in 
expositions of the notion of set is that sets are "built up" or "constructed" in 
some way out of previously given objects. '6 Though generally taken to be no 
more than a helpful metaphor in explaining the contemporary iterative conception 
of set, a number of thinkers seem to have endorsed the idea at a somewhat more 
literal level. Specifically, their writings suggest that sets are the upshots of a 
certain sort of constructive mental activity. 
Adumbrations of this idea can be seen in the very origins of set theory. Cantor 
himself held that the existence of a set was a matter of thinking of a plurality 
as a unity. 17 His distinguished mentor Dedekind is plausibly taken to be embracing 
a similar line when he writes that 
[i]t very frequently happens that different things ... can be considered 
from a common point of view, can be associated in the mind, and we 
say they foml a system S .... Such a system (an aggregate, a manifold, 
a totality) as an object of our thought is likewise a thing. 18 
Comparable thoughts are expressed by Hausdorff, Fraenkel, and more recently 
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by Schoenfield, Rucker, and Wang.!9 Of these it is Wang who seems to develop 
the idea most extensively. He writes: 
It is a basic feature of reality that there are many things. When a 
multitude of given objects can be collected together, we arrive at a set. 
For example, there are two tables in this room. We are ready to view 
them as given both separately and as a unity, and justify this by pointing 
to them or looking at them or thinking about them either one after the 
other or simultaneously. Somehow the viewing of certain objects 
together suggests a loose link which ties the objects together in our 
intuition. 20 
I interpret this passage in the following way. Wang here is keying on a basic 
feature of our cognitive capacities: the ability to selectively direct one's attention 
to certain objects and collect or gather them together mentally, to view them in 
such a way as to "tie them together in our intuition;" in Cantorian terms, to think 
of them as a unity. Wang stresses the particular manifestation of this capacity 
in perception, one of a number of related human perceptual capacities emphasized 
especially by the early Gestalt psychologists. 21 It is best illustrated for our purposes 
by a simple example. Consider the following array: 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
Think of the asterisks as being numbered left to right from 1 to 9, beginning at 
the upper left hand corner. While focussing on the middle dot 5, it is possible 
to vary at will which dots in the array stand out in one's visual field (with perhaps 
the exception of 5 itself), e.g., [1,5,9], [2,4,5,6,8], or even [1,5,8,9]. The dots 
thus picked out, I take Wang to be saying, are to be understood as the elements 
of a small "set" existing in the mind of the perceiver. 
The account obviously won't do as it stands. The axiom of extensionality, for 
instance, seems not to hold on this picture: if you and I direct our attention to 
the same dots, then each of us has his own "set", despite the fact that they have 
the same members. More importantly, human cognitive limitations put a severe 
restriction on the number and size of sets there can be. Wang is well aware of 
this, and hence builds an account of the nature of sets based on an idealized 
notion of collecting. Irrespective of the success of Wang's efforts, such an 
idealization, I believe, can be of use to us here in developing a model of divine 
activity that works sets into our activist framework. 
The idea is simple enough: we take sets to be the products of a collecting 
activity on God's part which we model on our own perceptual collecting 
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capacities. Consider first all the things that are not sets in this sense. While the 
number of these "first order" objects that we can apprehend at any given time 
is extremely limited, presumably God suffers from no such limitations; all of 
them fall under his purview. Furthermore, we can suppose that his awareness 
is not composed of more or less discrete experiential episodes the way ours is, 
and hence that he is capable of generating, not just one collection of first order 
objects at a time, but all possible collections of them simultaneously. 22 We 
suppose next that, once generated, the "second order" products of this collecting 
activity on first order objects are themselves candidates for "membership" in 
further collectings, and hence that God can produce also all possible "third order" 
collections that can be generated out of all the objects of the first two orders. 
The same of course ought to hold for these latter collections, and for the collections 
generated from them, and so on, for all finite orders. Finally, in a speculative 
application of the doctrine of divine infinitude, we postulate that there are no 
determinate bounds on God's collecting activity, and hence that it extends 
unbounded through the Cantorian infinite. 23 
Identifying sets with the products of God's collecting activity, then, and sup-
posing that God in fact does all the collecting it is possible for him to do, what 
we have is a full set theoretic cumulative hierarchy as rich as in any platonic 
vision. In this way we locate not just the platonist's PRPs, but the entire ontology 
of sets as well firmly within the mind of God. 
§3 A Volatile Ontology 
Alas, but as is so often wont to be the case in matters such as this, things are 
more complicated than they appear. The lessons of the last hundred years are 
clear that caution is to be enjoined in constructing an ontology that includes sets 
and PRPs. Too easily the abstract scientist, eager to exploit the philosophical 
power of a platonic ontology, finds himself engaged unwittingly in a metaphysical 
alchemy in which the rich ore of platonism is transmuted into the worthless dross 
of inconsistency. Our account thus far is a laboratory ripe for such a transmutation. 
There are several paradoxes that, on natural assumptions, are generated in the 
account as it stands. 
The first traces its lineage back to Russell, who reported a related paradox 
(distinct from the one bearing his name) in § 500 of the Principles. 24 In the 
cumulative or "iterative" picture of sets we've developed here, all the things that 
are not sets form the basic stuff on top of which the cumulative hierarchy is 
constructed. Now, the chief intuition behind the iterative picture, one implicit 
in our theistic model above, is that any available objects can be collected into 
a set; the "available" objects at any stage form the basis of new sets in the next 
stage. Thus, since propositions are not sets, all the propositions there are are 
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among the atoms ofthe cumulative hierarchy; and since all the atoms are available 
for collecting (God, after all, apprehends them all "prior" to his collecting), 
there is a set S of all propositions. I take it as a basic logical principle that for 
any entities x and y and any property P, 
(*) if x '* y, then [~Px] '* [~Py],25 
i.e., that if x is not identical with y, then the proposition [~Px] that x is P is 
not identical with the proposition [~Py] that y is P.26 Consider then any property 
you please; the property SET of being a set, say. Then by (*), there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between Pow(S) (the power set of S) and the set T = ([~ 
SET(s)] : s E Pow(S)}. But T ~ S, since T is a set of propositions, hence Pow(S) 
?,:- S,>7 contradicting Cantor's theorem. 
A strictly analogous paradox arises for properties (and, in general, relations 
as well). This is true in particular if one holds that every object a has an essence, 
i.e., the property being a, or perhaps being identical with a. 28 For the same 
reasons we gave in the case of propositions, properties (and relations) are also 
among the atoms of the cumulative hierarchy, and hence there is a set M of all 
properties. Essences being what they are, we have, for any x and y, that 
(**) if x '* y, then Ex '* Ey, 
where Ez is the essence of z. Consider then Pow(M). By (**) there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between Pow(M) and the set E = {Ez : Z E Pow(M)}. But E ~ 
M, since E is a set of properties, hence Pow(M) ,,;: M, contradicting Cantor 
once again. 29 
There are three quick replies to these related paradoxes to consider. The first 
is to question the fine-grainedness principles (*) and (**). Certainly there are 
views of PRPs on which this would be appropriate. Possible worlds theorists in 
the tradition of Montague, for example, define PRPs such that they are identical 
if necessarily coextensional, a "coarse-grained" view incompatible with the fine-
grained view we are advocating here. Similarly, views that might be broadly 
classified as "Aristotelian" hold that properties and relations exist first and 
foremost "in" the objects that have them, not separate from them, and are 
"abstracted" somehow by the mind. Such views rarely find any need for PRPs 
any more fine-grained than are needed to distinguish one state of an object, or 
one connection between several objects, from another. Whatever the appeal of 
these alternatives, the problem is that they are out of keeping with our activist 
model. If we are pushing the idea that PRPs are literally the products of God's 
conceiving activity, then it would seem that properties which intuitively differ 
in content, i.e., which are such that grasping one does not entail simultaneously 
grasping the other, could not be the products of exactly the same intellective 
activity and hence must be distinct. This is especially pronounced in the cases 
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of singular propositions and essences that "involve" distinct individuals, such as 
those with which we are concerned in (*) and (**); it is just not plausible that, 
e.g., singular propositions "about" distinct individuals could nonetheless be the 
products of the same activity. To abandon these principles in the context of our 
present framework, then, would be unpalatable. 
The second reply is simply to deny the power set axiom. After all, one might 
argue, many set theorists find the axiom dubious; so why suppose it is true in 
general, and in the arguments at hand in particular? 
The power set axiom has indeed been called into question by mathematical 
logicians and philosophers of mathematics over the years. The root cause of this 
disaffection, however, has always been the radically nonconstructive character 
of the axiom-mathematicians are not in general able to specify any sort of 
general property or procedure that will enable them to pick out every arbitrary 
subset of a given set. In this sense, it is the platonic axiom par excellence, 
declaring sets to exist in utter spite of any human capacity to grasp or "construct" 
them. 
It should be clear that any sort of objection on these grounds, as with the 
previous objection, is just out of place here. For obviously we are far from 
supposing that set existence has anything whatever to do with human cognitive 
capacities. Quite the contrary; on our model, the puzzle would rather be how 
the power set axiom could not be true. For supposing that God has collected 
some set s, since each of its members falls under his purview just as the elements 
of some small finite collection of our own construction fall under ours, how 
could he not be capable of generating all possible collections that can be formed 
from members of s as well? So this response to the paradoxes is ineffective. 3D 
The third reply is that, since there are at least as many propositions (and 
properties) as there are sets, it is evident that there is no set S of all propositions 
any more than there is a set of all sets; there are just "too many" of them. Hence 
the argument above breaks down. The same goes for properties, so the second 
paradox fares no better. 
Briefly, the problem with this reply is that how many of a given sort of thing 
there are in and of itself has nothing whatever to do with whether or not there 
is a set of those things. 31 The reason there is no set of all sets is not because 
there are "too many" of them, but rather because there is no "top" to the cumulative 
hierarchy, no definite point at which no further sets can be constructed. On our 
model as it stands, however, as nonsets, the propositions and properties there 
are exist "prior" (in a conceptual sense) to the construction of all the sets. Hence, 
they are all equally available for membership. But if so, there seems no reason 
for denying the existence of the sets Sand M.32 So an appeal to how many PRPs 
there are won't tum back the arguments. 
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§4 A Russell-Type Solution 
Though always discomfiting, the discovery of paradox needn't necessarily 
spell disaster. As in the case of set theory, it may rather be an occasion for 
insight and clarification. Russell's original paradox of naive set theory was 
grounded in a mistaken conception of the structure of sets that was uncovered 
with the development of the iterative picture. Perhaps, in the same way, the 
paradoxes here have taken root in a similar misconception about PRPs. There 
are two avenues to explore. 
The final paragraph in the last section uncovers a crucial assumption at work 
in the paradoxes: that all PRPs are conceptually prior to the construction of the 
sets; or again, that all the PRPs there are are among the atoms of the hierarchy. 
The Russellian will challenge this. He will argue that one cannot so cavalierly 
divide the world into an ordered hierarchy of sets on the one hand and a logically 
unstructured domain of nonsets on the other. For although they are not sets, the 
non sets too fall into a natural hierarchy of logical types. More specifically, in 
the simple theory of types, concrete and abstract particulars, or "individuals", 
are the entities of the lowest type, usually designated 'i'. Then, recursively, 
where t 1, •.• , tn are types, let (I]> ... , tn) be the type of n-place relation that takes 
entities of these n types as its arguments. So, for example, a property of individuals 
would be of type (i); a 2-place relation between individuals and properties of 
individuals would be of type (i,(i»; and so on. The type of any entity is thus, 
in an easily definable sense, higher than the type of any of its possible arguments. 33 
By dividing entities whose types are the same height into disjoint levels we 
arrive at a hierarchy of properties and relations analogous to, but rather more 
complicated than, the (finite) levels of the cumulative hierarchy. 
To wed this conception with our current model we propose that both sets and 
PRPs are built up together in the divine intellect so that we have God both 
constructing new sets and conceiving new PRPs in every level of the resulting 
hierarchy. Thus, at the most basic level are individuals; at the next level God 
constructs all sets of individuals and conceives all properties and relations that 
take individuals as arguments; at the next level he constructs all sets of entities 
of the first two levels and conceives all properties and relations that take entities 
of the previous (and perhaps both previous) level(s) as arguments; and so on. 
Thus, since there are new PRPs at every level, it is evident that there will be 
no level at which there occurs, e.g., the set of all properties, and hence it seems 
that the paradoxes above can be explained in much the same way as Russell's 
original paradox. 34 
Easier said than done. Serious impediments stand in the way of implementing 
these ideas. First of all, there are several well known objections to type theory 
that are no less cogent here than in other contexts. For example, on a typed 
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conception of PRPs, there can be no universal properties, such as the property 
of being self-identical, since no properties have all entities in their "range of 
significance."35 The closest approximation to them are properties true of every-
thing of a given type. But, thinking in terms of our model, even if many PRPs 
are typed, there seems no reason why God shouldn't also be able to conceive 
properties whose extensions, and hence whose ranges of significance, include 
all entities whatsoever. 
Along these same lines, type theory also prevents any property from falling 
within its own range of significance, and in particular it mles out the possibility 
of self-exemplification. Thus, for example, there can be no such thing as the 
property of being a property, or of being abstract, but only anemic, typed images 
of these more robust properties at each level, true only of the properties or 
abstract entities of the previous level. 
Standard problems aside, much more serious problems remain. In many simple 
type theories, including our brief account above, propositions are omitted 
altogether. Those that make room for them36 lump them all together in a single 
type (quite rightly, in the context of simple type theory). This clearly won't do 
on the current proposal since the entities of any given type are all at the same 
level and hence form a set at the next level, thus allowing in sufficient air to 
revive our first paradox. 
A related difficulty is that this proposal is still vulnerable to a modified version 
of the second paradox as well. Consider any relation that holds between indi-
viduals u and sets s of properties of individuals, e.g., the relation I that holds 
between u and s just in case u exemplifies some member of s. Let A be the set 
of all properties of individuals. For each s E Pow(A), we have the property [Ax 
Ixs] of bearing I to s. By a generalization of the fine-grainedness schemas (*) 
and (**) (cf. note 29), for all s,s' E Pow(A) we have that 
(***) if s =1= s', then [Ax Ixs] =1= [Ax Isx']. 
Consider now the set 1* = {[Ax lxs] : s E Pow(A)}. By (***) there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between Pow(A) and 1*. But 1* ~ A, since 1* is a set of 
properties of individuals. Hence, Pow(A) ~'A, contradicting Cantor's theorem. 
A little reflection reveals a feature common to both paradoxes that seems to 
lie at the heart of the difficulty. First, we need an intuitive fix on the idea of 
(the existence of) one entity "presupposing the availability of' another. The idea 
we're after is simple: for God to create (i.e., construct or conceive) certain 
entities, he must have "already" created certain others; the former, that is to say, 
presuppose the availability of the latter. For sets this is clear. Say that an entity 
e is a constituent of a set s just in case it is a member of the transitive closure 
of S.37 Then we can say that a set s presupposes the availability of some entity 
e just in case e is a constituent of s. For PRPs we need to say a little more. As 
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suggested above, there seems a clear sense in which PRPs, like sets, can be 
said to have constituents. Thus, a set-like "singleton" property such as [Ax x = 
Kripke] contains Kripke as a constituent. But not just Kripke; for the identity 
relation too is a part of the property's make-up, or "internal structure;" it is, one 
might say, a structured composite of those two entities. (We will develop this 
idea in somewhat more detail shortly.) Combining the two notions of constituency 
(one for sets, one for PRPs), we can generalize the concept of presupposition 
to both sets and PRPs: one entity e presupposes the availability of another e* 
just in case e* is a constituent of e. 
Now, even though the properties [Ax Ixs] are properties of individuals, if we 
look at their internal structure, we see that many of these properties presuppose 
the availability of entities that themselves presuppose the availability of those 
very properties, to wit, those properties P = [Axlxs] such thatP E s. (Analogously 
for those propositions p = [A SET(s)] such that pES.) Call such properties 
self-presupposing; this notion alone, independent of the power set axiom and 
our fine-grainedness principles, is sufficient for generating Russell-type para-
doxes. 38 Conjoined with power set and fine-grainedness, the possibility of self-pre-
supposing properties can be held responsible for the sort of unrestrained prolif-
eration of PRPs of (in general) any type that fuels the Cantor-style paradoxes 
as well. 
The source of all our paradoxes, then, in broader terms, lies in a failure so 
far adequately to capture the dependence of complex PRPs on their internal 
constituents. What we want, then, is a model that is appropriately sensitive to 
internal structure, but which at the same time does not run afoul of the standard 
problems of type theory. 
§5 A Constructive Solution 
Let's review. Our excursion into type theory was prompted by doubts over 
the idea that PRPs are conceptually prior to the construction of sets. Type theory 
suggested an alternative: PRPs themselves form a hierarchy analogous to the 
cumulative hierarchy of sets such that a PRP's place in the hierarchy depends 
on the kind of arguments it can sensibly take. The idea then was to join the two 
sorts of hierarchy into one. However, even overlooking the standard problems 
of type theory, we found that the resulting activist model (-sketch) was still 
subject to paradox. Our analysis of these paradoxes led us to see that our problems 
stemmed from the fact that our models were insensitive to the dependence of 
PRPs on their internal constituents. 
How, then, do we capture this dependence? Here we can draw on some recent 
ideas in logic and metaphysics. Logically complex PRPs are naturally thought 
of as being "built up" from simpler entities by the application of a variety of 
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logical operations. For example, any two PRPs can be seen as the primary 
constituents of a further PRP, their conjunction, which is the result of a conjoining 
operation. Thus, in particular, the conjunction of two properties P and Q can 
he thought of as the relation [Axy Px & Qy] that a bears to b just in case Pa and 
Qb. A further operation, reflection, can be understood to act so as to transform 
this relation into the property [Ax Px & Qx] of having P and Q. Related operations 
can be taken to yield complements (e.g., [Ax ~Px]), generalizations (e.g., [>t 
(3x)(Px)]), and PRPs that are directly "about" other objects such as our set-like 
property [Ax x = Kripke], or the "singular" proposition [>t PHL(Kaplan)] that 
Kaplan is a philosopher. 39 
On this view, then, the constituents of a complex PRP are simply those entities 
that are needed to construct the PRP by means of the logical operations, just as 
the constituents of a set are those entities that are needed to construct the set. It 
is in this sense that a complex PRP is dependent on its constituents. This then 
suggests that, analogous to sets on the iterative conception, PRPs are best viewed 
as internally "well-founded," or at least, noncircular, in the sense that a PRP 
cannot be one its own constituents. 40 
This picture of PRPs is especially amenable to activism. For as with set 
construction, the activist can take the logical operations that yield complex PRPs 
to be quite literally activities of the divine intellect. This leads us to a further, 
more adequate model of the creation of abstract entities. At the logically most 
basic level of creation we find concrete objects and logically simple properties 
and relations (whatever those may be). The next level consists of (i) all the 
objects of the previous level (this will make the levels cumulative), (ii) all sets 
that can be formed from those objects, and (iii) all new PRPs that can be formed 
by applying the logical operations to those objects. The third level is formed in 
the same manner from the second. Similarly for all succeeding finite levels. As 
in our initial models, there seems no reason to think this activity cannot continue 
into the transfinite. Accordingly, we postulate a "limit" level that contains all 
the objects created in the finite levels, which itself forms the basis of new, 
infinite levels. And so it continues on through the Cantorian transfinite. 
Now, how do things stand with respect to our paradoxes? As we should hope, 
they cannot arise on the current model. Consider the first paradox. Since there 
are new propositions formed at every level of the hierarchy, there cannot be a 
set of all propositions any more than there can be a set of all nonselfmembered 
sets. Similarly for the second paradox: since essences (as depicted above) contain 
the objects that exemplify them in their internal structure and hence do not appear 
to be simple, they too occur arbitrarily high up in the hierarchy and hence also 
are never collected into a set. What about the two new paradoxes above? The 
first of these is just a type-theoretic variant on the original paradoxes, and so 
poses no additional difficulty. And although the concept of self-presupposition 
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can be reconstructed in our type-free framework, the corresponding paradox still 
cannot arise since there can be no set of all non-self-presupposing properties as 
the paradox requires. 4l We seem at last to have found our way out of this dense 
thicket of Cantorian and Russellian paradoxes. 
But our task is still not quite complete. Recall that one of our first orders of 
business was to work (cardinal) numbers into the activist framework. We opted 
for the Cantorian-inspired view that the numbers are properties shared by 
equinumerous sets. But just where do they fit into our somewhat more developed 
picture? Intuitively, numbers seem to be logically simple; they do not appear to 
be, e.g., conjunctions or generalizations of other PRPs. Hence, they seem to 
belong down at the bottom of our hierarchy. It follows that there is a set C of 
all numbers at the next level, according to our model. But this supposition, of 
course, assuming the truth of the axioms of ZF, leads to paradox in a number 
of ways. For example, one can use the axiom of replacement on C to prove that 
there is a set of all von Neumann cardinals. I've argued elsewhere42 that, on 
certain conceptions of the abstract universe that might allow "overly large" sets, 
it is appropriate to restrict this axiom to sufficiently "small" sets, and such a 
restriction would not permit its use here. This would still not redeem the situation, 
though. On our model, I think we must hold that for every set there exists a 
definite property which is its cardinal number. For it seems quite impossible that 
God should construct a set without also conceiving its cardinality, the property 
it shares with any other set that can be put into one-to-one correspondence with 
it. Hence, the set C of all numbers must itself have a cardinality k, and so k E 
C. But it is easy to show (with only unexceptionable uses of replacement) that 
k is strictly greater than every member of C,43 and hence that k>k. Once more 
we have to confront paradox. 
Happily, there is a simple and intuitive solution to this paradox. How many 
numbers must we say there are? Given our understanding of the numbers as 
properties of sets, and our reasoning in the previous paragraph, if we divide up 
the universe of sets according to size, then there must be as many numbers as 
there are divisions. Numbers are thus in a certain sense dependent on sets in a 
way that other sorts of properties are not. This suggests a natural way of fitting 
numbers into our hierarchy in such a way as to avoid paradox: a given number 
is not introduced into the hierarchy until a set is constructed whose cardinality 
is that number. The number is then introduced at the next level; God, we might 
say, doesn't conceive the number until he "has to." Since there are larger and 
larger sets at every new stage in our hierarchy, there will be no point after which 
new numbers are no longer introduced, and thus there can be no set of them. 
Hence, our numerical paradox above cannot get started. 
Since our model is informal, the only rigorous way of demonstrating that it 
is indeed paradox-free is to formalize the picture of the abstract universe it yields 
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and then to prove the consistency of the resulting theory. This can be done. The 
universe of the activist model can be formalized in a first-order theory that 
includes all of ZFC and a rich logic ofPRPs that embodies all the fine-grainedness 
principles above; and this theory is provably consistent relative to ZF. 
§8 Loose Ends 
Many difficult and important issues remain, of course. Perhaps the most 
pressing are those having to do with modality. For instance, a natural question 
facing activism is whether God could have created more, fewer, or other PRPs 
than the ones he in fact created. Morris and I argued in "Absolute Creation" that 
there is a relatively straightforward answer to this question, but the hierarchical 
picture developed here suggests that the question is somewhat more subtle. In 
particular, does it not seem possible that God could have continued his collecting 
activity and generated a set that contains all the objects in the actual universe? 
Couldn't he then have generated new PRPs that would have contained that set 
as a constituent? If so, then it seems there could at least have been more PRPs 
than those that exist in fact. A second issue is engendered by the fact that the 
constructive nature of complex PRPs seems to entail the doctrine known as 
existentialism, i.e., the doctrine that PRPs are ontologically dependent on their 
constituents. 
An adequate treatment of these issues will require a clear account of the truth 
conditions of modal propositions. This in turn raises the question of how modal 
propositions, and modal PRPs generally, are to be worked into the activist 
universe. Important issues all, deserving much further exploration; for the time 
being we will rest content with the ones we've managed to address thus far. 44 
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